and the other Slavs than between the Serbs and the Croats. The two groups coincide in the matter of the zadruga (communal holding of rural property), and in matters where considerable differences are to be noted, for example in the arrangement of houses, the boundary line of difference does not coincide with the Serbo-Croat frontier. The Roman type with a single hearth predominates in Montenegro, while in Dalmatia, in Hercegovina, and in the other areas the High German type with two hearths predominates.

According to Weissbach, the Serbo-Croats present the following characteristics: tall stature, strong preponderance of the dark type, especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina, strongly brachycephalic and of an extremely large cranial capacity. The cephalic index is an average of 84 (85.7 among the Bosnians and the Croats of today). The cranial capacity is 1,524. There are 93.5% brachycephalics and 6% mesocephalics. Weissbach concluded that the Serbs and Croats should be considered as forming one and the same people. Recently Mr. Zupanic declared that physical differences exist between the two national groups; but it is uncertain, at the present stage of the science, whether his statement can be justified. From the language point of view, the south Slav group in the west splits up as follows: the Cakavci (1) being identified with /175/ the Croats, the Stokavci with the Serbs, and the Kajkavci with the Slovenes. Miklosic still distinguishes a Serbian tongue and a Croatian tongue. But it is proven today that this distinction has no basis.

1. These groups are thus named on the basis of the manner in which they say or pronounce the relative pronoun. /rather, pronominal word ca, sto, kaj, meaning "what". Editor./

Nevertheless, we should point out some dialectical shadings which are not in accordance with the political distinctions. Alongside the two great dialects of Stokavci and Cakavci, there are other transitional dialects: the Kaikavski of the west, toward the Slovenes, the dialect of Prizren or of Timok, otherwise called "Old Serb", and the Svrljiski dialect to the east toward the Bulgars. Several eminent philologists, notably Belic, relate the Kaikavstina to the Slovene tongue. According to the recent studies of Mr. Resetar, the Kaikav territory is separated from the other two by a line which starts from Turnovac, on the Drava, reaches Virovitica, runs around Bjelovar, goes to Trnovitica, Jasenovac on the Sava, follows the Sava as far as Belaj, then runs to Trzic, Plaski, Brlog, Nin (Nona) and Zadar (Zara).

1 [i.e. Serbs and Croats -- Analyst]

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175* 793 423 The monasteries were, on the whole, the only large private landowners, and supplied an example by their organization of large manors worked by half-free peasants.

175* With the throne weakened by the pretensions of the Polish nobility, an aggressive foreign policy was unthinkable. After Vladislav Hermann accepted the status of a German vassal in 1080, no Polish prince dared assume the title of king for two centuries. The Elbe valley and Silesia were definitely lost, together with the Pomeranian seaboard west of the Vistula. Then, early in the thirteenth century, when the still pagan Prussians menaced Duke Conrad of Mazovia (along the Vistula northwest of Warsaw) he turned for aid to the knights of the Teutonic Order, who entered Mazovia and occupied the districts ceded to them in 1229. They immediately founded strong points at Thorn, Kulm, Elbing and elsewhere, and by placing themselves under papal protection obviated any chance of Polish sovereignty. The next fifty years were occupied by the struggle of the Teutonic Order, supported by the margraves of Brandenburg and Meissen, against the Prussians. Königsberg was founded in 1255, when the Slavic Duke of Pomerelia, on the lower Vistula north of Thorn, became a vassal of the Margrave of Brandenburg, and Danzig fell into German hands for the first time. The Brandenburgers, however, were unable to hold it, and it was not until 1343 that Polish claims to the so-called Pomorze were given up.

175* 721 Apart from domestic disorders, Poland was also shaken during this period by a disastrous invasion of the Tartars, who in 1241 burned Cracow, invaded Silesia, and sacked Breslau. The depopulation caused both by civil war and this invasion impoverished the Polish princes and induced them to encourage German immigration. The movement had started even before the onslaught of the Tartars, for German villages began to appear in Silesia as early as 1140. But after the Tartar incursion, German settlements spread to every part of Poland. The belt laid waste by the Tartars had been thickly settled since the principal commercial highways between the west and the

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war, now had only three—Russia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. One aspect of her new position which represented an innovation was her transformation into a great maritime nation, thanks to the three ports, Stettin, Gdynia, and Danzig, and to her 312 miles of coast-line. Nevertheless, her destiny would henceforth be more closely bound to that of Central Europe, while remaining subordinate to the *entente* with Moscow.

The western frontiers were approved by the plebiscite of June 30, which covered not only the frontier-ratification, but also the abolition of the Senate and the economic organisation of the State (Agrarian reform and nationalisation of key industries). The first ballot gave 10,534,697 in favour and 995,584 against; the second gave 7,844,522 in favour and 3,686,029 against; the third, 8,896,106 in favour and 2,634,446 against.

This popular referendum did not have the tranquillising effects that had seemingly been expected. Poland continued to be a prey to 'terrorist' agitation, the repression of which, in turn, gave rise to scenes of violence and to exactions. While dissociating himself from the extremists, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, M. Mikolajczyk, himself protested against the way in which the referendum had been carried out (except in Cracow, where the 'Noes' had been in the majority). So the British Government reserved its opinion on the legitimacy which this poll conferred on the régime, and awaited the general elections before giving legal recognition to the new state of affairs. And the whole of 1946 was taken up with exchanges of subacid notes between London and Washington on the one side and Warsaw on the other. The Anglo-Americans denounced the persecution to which the Opposition was subjected, and considered that the Polish Government was failing in the undertaking given in execution of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to guarantee the liberty of elections. But the Russians interpreted quite differently both the scope of these agreements and the meaning of the word 'liberty'. And so the most obvious result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of England and the United States was to intensify Polish-Sovietic solidarity.

The formation, in June, of a National Unity Government under the Presidency of M. Osubka Morawski seemed, for the time being, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Anglo-Americans, although the dissident Polish Government in London

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in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.